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Theo A.F. Kuipers
MATHEMATICS AND EXPLICATION 
REPLY TO JEAN PAUL VAN BENDEGEM 
Both specific claims of Jean Paul Van Bendegem are very plausible. First, 
there are many convincing mathematical arguments that are no genuine 
mathematical proofs and, second, the way in which these arguments build up 
our support of mathematical statements is quite similar to the way it is done in 
the empirical sciences. Since Van Bendegem is, like me, in general very much 
interested in the similarities between “science, philosophy, theology, and 
mathematics,” I will start this reply by summarizing my view on the 
similarities and differences. Next I deal with his specific claims. 
Mathematical Research as Concept Explication 
Leaving theology here aside, I would like to claim that the basic similarity 
between philosophy and mathematics is the focus on the explication of 
informal concepts. In SiS I wrote (p. 8):
For philosophy and mathematics the fourth type of program, the explicative research 
program, is the most important type. Such programs are directed at concept explication, 
i.e., the construction of a simple, precise and useful concept, which is, in addition, similar 
to a given informal concept (cf. Carnap 1963, pp. 1-18). For example, the concepts of 
‘logical consequence’ and ‘probability’ have given rise to very successful explicative 
programs in the borderland between philosophy and mathematics. One of the main 
explicative programs dealt with in ICR is intended to explicate the intuitive idea of 
‘truthlikeness’. Although several analyses in the present book [SiS] could have been 
explicitly presented as examples of concept explication, we have made this identification 
in only a few chapters, and not even very rigorously at that, … . 
 The strategy of concept explication is the following. From the intuitive concept to be 
explicated one tries to derive conditions of adequacy that the explicated concept will have 
to satisfy, and evident examples and counter-examples that the explicated concept has to 
include or exclude. 
Let me also mention that explication may go further than the explication of 
informal concepts, it may also aim at the explication of intuitive judgments, 
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i.e., intuitions, including their justification, demystification or even 
undermining. A main example in ICR concerns the intuition about the 
functionality of choosing empirically more successful theories in order to 
enhance truth approximation. Another, certainly demystifying, example is the 
intuition that beauty may be an indication of the truth (Kuipers 2002). The 
strategy of “intuition explication” is a plausible extension of that involving 
concept explication. 
So far the special nature of mathematical and philosophical research has 
been highlighted somewhat, but the similarity between concept explication and 
empirical research may not yet be very convincing. However, in several 
branches of mathematics the domain of research is quasi-empirical. For 
example, as Lakatos (1976) has demonstrated so beautifully, the history of the 
explication of the idea of a regular polyhedron and Euler’s conjecture for all 
polyhedra that the number of vertices plus the number of faces equals the 
number of edges plus two, is such a quasi-empirical story. However, not all 
mathematical concepts and theorems have this feature. For example, the 
informal logico-mathematical notion of a group is primarily an abstract notion 
with, to be sure, many evident examples and non-examples. There is 
nevertheless quite some similarity between progress in explicative research on 
the one hand and (descriptive and explanatory) nomological and design 
research on the other. In SiS, pp. 263-4, I wrote:
Like nomological research, this [explicative] task may be represented in terms of 
conceptual possibilities. Let us further assume first that there is a unique solution and 
hence a unique set of desired possibilities. Let a provisional explication also be conceived 
as (determining) a unique extension of conceptual possibilities. Then it is plausible to 
define formal progress in explicative research formally in the same way as in the case of 
nomological research. 
 In real-life explicative research, however, the resemblance of a provisional 
explication has to be evaluated in other terms. In particular, such evaluation takes place in 
terms of evident examples, that is, evidently desired possibilities, evident ‘non-examples’, 
that is, evidently undesired possibilities, and, finally, so-called conditions of adequacy, 
that is, conditions to be fulfilled and which correspond to desired features. Hence, the 
definition of ‘conceptual progress’ in explicative research is straightforward. Provisional 
explication Y is better than provisional explication X, roughly speaking, if and only if Y
treats more evident examples and non-examples properly and/or fulfills more conditions 
of adequacy. 
The partial analogy between nomological and design research on the one hand 
and explicative research on the other is obvious, including the possibility of 
functionally equivalent explications. However, at least two differences with 
nomological research are very interesting. Whereas evident non-examples play 
an important role in explicative research, there is no nomological analogue for 
them, as this would require the realization of nomic impossibilities. Moreover, 
nomological research is more or less bound to a unique solution, whereas 
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explicative research may well lead to the conclusion that two or more 
interesting explications can be given, which are functionally equivalent 
relative to the desired features but nevertheless mutually exclude each other. 
Design research shares with explicative research this possibility of more 
than one useful solution. However, as in nomological research, there does not 
seem to be an analogue for evident non-examples in the case of design 
research. Moreover, it is argued in some detail in SiS, Chapter 9, that formal 
progress in design research is relatively easy to determine, but not so in 
concept explication. Hence, although there is also a strong analogy between 
design and explicative research, i.e., both aim at a certain product, the analogy 
is not perfect. 
Let me use the opportunity to stress something that I forgot to do in SiS. 
Although I mention in SiS that explicative research can also pertain to crucial 
terms in the empirical sciences, I forgot to emphasize that in this case 
conditions of adequacy and evident examples and non-examples should agree 
as much as possible with up to date empirical, in particular nomological, 
research. As Hempel (1952, p. 12) already put it: “An explication of a given 
set of terms, then, combines essential aspects of meaning analysis and 
empirical analysis.” Ideally, concept explication in the empirical sciences leads 
to an improved conceptual framework for further empirical research. 
Mathematical Arguments 
Van Bendegem’s paper nicely illustrates that the transition from mathematics 
to philosophy of mathematics is methodologically not a big step. Its main aim 
is to start the explication of the informal notion of a mathematical argument, as 
a much weaker notion than that of a mathematical proof. As a matter of fact, 
the examples (b)-(g) are at least in part intended as evident cases of 
mathematical arguments not qualifying as proofs. Moreover, some of the 
general statements evidently function as a condition of adequacy or, very 
interestingly, as a “non-condition” of adequacy. In particular, the second claim 
in Section 4, according to which the combination of arguments for A and AB
need not be an argument for B, is an intriguing and perhaps disputable but 
nevertheless clear illustration of an intended non-condition of adequacy. In that 
section, Van Bendegem also sets the stage for an explication of the way 
arguments change our degree of confidence in a mathematical statement. 
Let me close with a question that intrigues me on the basis of reading Van 
Bendegem’s paper: what are the differences and similarities between 
arguments that can be transformed into, or replaced by, genuine proofs and 
arguments which cannot? More specifically, I mean the following. As is well-
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known, in many cases it is possible to prove a claim without really calculating 
and deducing the conclusion, but by giving a very elegant argument, of a 
mathematical and/or empirical nature, that immediately convinces everybody 
who starts to understand it. In Kuipers (1991), I collected 10 such examples. 
One of them deals with mixing white and red wine. Two identical bottles 
contain five glasses of wine, the one white, the other red. The bottles can 
contain six glasses. Now one pours a glassful from the bottle with red wine 
into the one with white wine, shakes the latter very well, and then pours a glass 
of the mixture back into the red wine bottle, and again shakes very well. 
Which bottle has the highest concentration of wine that originally comes from 
the other bottle? Of course, one can make a calculation, leading to the 
conclusion that the concentrations are the same. However, one may also 
immediately see this solution by realizing that otherwise the total amount of 
white and red wine would have changed. Assuming that this in itself cannot 
count as a proof but can be transformed into an indirect proof, it seems to be an 
argument of a third kind: it is neither a proof in the strict sense nor an 
argument that merely increases our degree of conviction. 
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